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Abstract
In this paper, we respond to a paper by Jamal and colleagues published in Trials in October 2015 and take
an opportunity to continue the much-needed debate about what applied scientific realism is. The paper by
Jamal et al. is useful because it exposes the challenges of combining a realist evaluation approach (as developed by
Pawson and Tilley) with the randomised controlled trial (RCT) design.
We identified three fundamental differences that are related to paradigmatic differences in the treatment of causation
between post-positivist and realist logic: (1) the construct of mechanism, (2) the relation between mediators
and moderators on one hand and mechanisms and contexts on the other hand, and (3) the variable-oriented
approach to analysis of causation versus the configurational approach.
We show how Jamal et al. consider mechanisms as observable, external treatments and how their approach
reduces complex causal processes to variables. We argue that their proposed RCT design cannot provide a
truly realist understanding. Not only does the proposed realist RCT design not deal with the RCT’s inherent
inability to “unpack” complex interventions, it also does not enable the identification of the dynamic interplay
among the intervention, actors, context, mechanisms and outcomes, which is at the core of realist research.
As a result, the proposed realist RCT design is not, as we understand it, genuinely realist in nature.
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Background
In October 2015, Jamal and colleagues [1] published a
paper on realist randomised controlled trials (RCT), in
which they present a detailed overview and guidance of
how realist RCTs can be designed. Jamal et al. argue
convincingly that RCTs “examine quite crude questions
about ‘what works’ without explaining the underlying
processes of implementation and mechanisms of action,
and how these vary by contextual characteristics of
person and place” (p. 1). They rightly point out the
problems of generalisation of findings of RCTs of public
health interventions, especially when the interventions
are complex in nature. They also acknowledge that RCTs
have difficulties in capturing the dynamic agency-
structure interaction that shapes the implementation
and the adoption by actors, as well as the outcomes of
complex interventions. Yet the authors argue that realist
RCTs address “these gaps while preserving the strengths
of RCTs in providing evidence with strong internal valid-
ity in estimating effects” (p. 2).
We fully agree with the authors’ analysis of the short-
comings of RCTs of complex public health interventions.
The RCT design has a number of limitations which
make it not only difficult to apply to truly complex inter-
ventions but also incompatible with a realist approach to
research, as we will describe herein. Although scholars
like Blackwood et al. [2] have claimed that realism and
RCT can coexist and while we appreciate the dedicated
work of Jamal and colleagues, their article presents an
important opportunity to continue the much needed
debate about applied scientific realism—the foundation
of the approach to realist research developed by Pawson
and Tilley [3]—and the extent to which its logic
becomes subverted when merged with post-positivist
approaches to research design, such as the RCT.
Below, we explain how we identified three differences
between the position of Jamal and colleagues and our
own understanding of scientific realism. These are
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related to paradigmatic differences in the treatment of
causation between post-positivist and realist logic: (1)
the construct of mechanism, (2) the relation between
mediators and moderators on one hand and mechanisms
and contexts on the other hand, and (3) the variable-
oriented approach to analysis of causation versus the
configurational approach.
Main text
In essence, Jamal et al. propose “realist RCTs” that use a
technical process (moderator and mediator statistical
analysis) to test hypotheses about observable phenom-
ena. However, realism acknowledges that not all that
matters can be observed (Table 1). In particular, realist
research should concern underlying causal processes
that lead to outcomes—so called mechanisms. While
these may not be directly observable nor easily measur-
able, they matter; from a realist perspective, they are
central to explaining causation.
What is a mechanism?
The notion of mechanism is central to understanding
disease aetiology and treatment. Mechanisms are also
central in realist thinking, but these are conceptualized
differently: interventions trigger mechanisms in specific
contexts, and that leads to outcome patterns. The nature
of mechanisms has long been a topic of discussion in
realist circles [4–10], but wide agreement exists that
“response to resources” is the defining feature of
mechanisms in the work of Pawson and Tilley [3]. From
a scientific realist perspective, intervention outcomes
can be traced back to the resources offered and how
stakeholders and participants respond to those re-
sources. To put it another way, making and sustaining
different choices requires a change in a participant’s rea-
soning (e.g. in their values, beliefs, attitudes or the logic
they apply to a particular situation) and/or a change in
the resources (e.g. information, skills, material resources,
or support) they have available to them. Realism asserts
that it is the interaction between “reasoning and re-
sources” that underpins intervention outcomes [11]. As
a consequence, interventions work in different ways for
different people because they respond to resources of-
fered by the intervention in different ways.
By their very nature, mechanisms are latent, invisible
and sensitive to variations in context [12]. Mechanisms
can play out at the level of individuals, groups, organi-
sations and society. Ideas about mechanisms can be
found in psychological, social, cultural, political and
economic theories [6]. Thus “mechanism” in the realist
sense does not equate to intervention components but
rather to how the resources and opportunities created
by the intervention are taken up (or not) by people in
different contexts.
Jamal et al. define mechanisms as aspects of interven-
tions. For instance, on p. 2, Jamal et al. write “The evalu-
ator needs to hypothesise and test how the intervention
theory of change interacts with context to enable (or
Table 1 Key principles underpinning realist research [3, 11, 18, 19] and [20]
• Realism asserts a reality exists independently of the observer: both the material and the social worlds are “real”, at least in the sense that anything
that can cause observable outcomes is itself real.
• Knowing reality through science is unavoidably relative to the researcher: developing knowledge on reality is constrained by perception and
cognition, and is socially constructed. Nonetheless, reality constrains the interpretations that are reasonable to make of it, meaning that it is
possible to move gradually closer to an understanding that better reflects the reality under study.
• According to realism, the world is differentiated and stratified, consisting not only of observable and measurable events, but also of structures, which
have powers and liabilities capable of generating events. These structures may be present even where, as in the social world and much of the natural
world, they do not generate regular patterns of events [20].
• Causality concerns not a direct relationship between two observable and discrete events, but a relationship between “the ‘causal powers’ or ‘liabilities’ of
objects or relations, or more generally, their ways-of-acting of ‘mechanisms’” [20] and the outcomes of those mechanisms.
• Context matters—a lot. Contextual conditions may have an influence on the implementation of the intervention, may or may not provide the necessary
conditions for the mechanism that will be triggered and thus may have an effect on the observed outcome. An interaction is always present between
context and mechanism. Context includes features such as social, economic and political structures; social policies; organisational context; participants;
staffing; and geographical and historical context.
• The interaction among intervention (strategies), actors, context and mechanism is what creates the intervention’s impacts or outcomes.
• Since interventions work differently in different contexts and through different mechanisms, they cannot simply be replicated from one context
to another and automatically achieve the same outcomes. Theory-based understandings about the influence of contexts on mechanism and
resulting outcomes (i.e. “what works for whom, in what contexts, why and how” are, however, transferable.
• Realist research is theory incarnate. It starts with a fragile theory and ends with a fallible model. Theory is to be understood as theories of
the middle range, as defined by Merton [21], a bundle of hypotheses that can be tested empirically [22]. As such, these theories are expressed in
such a way that they can be supported, refuted or refined against empirically derived data. Often, the term ‘programme theory’ is used to
denote the starting point of a realist inquiry, which is one or more testable hypotheses that spell out how intervention strategies are expected to lead to
the outcomes, for whom, in what conditions, how and why.
• Realist research progresses through choosing methods that will provide the data needed to help “test” the initial programme theory in terms of effective
ness (Did the programme achieve its goal?) and of causal processes (How did the observed results come about, in which context, why and for whom?). Realist
research is methodologically promiscuous, potentially using quantitative and qualitative data to test theories.
• In summary, in the account of realism we propose here, outcome patterns do not occur directly because of the intervention strategies that
are used. Instead, outcomes are caused by invisible mechanisms that are sensitive to context. The interactions and influences between context,
mechanism and outcome may be explained by one (or more) middle-range theories. To develop, support, refute or refine these theories, both quantita
tive and qualitative data may be needed.
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disable) implementation, causal mechanisms and, ultim-
ately, outcomes.” It is, however, not the “intervention
theory of change” that interacts with context. Rather, sci-
entific realism holds that interventions take place in spe-
cific contexts and address actors, who decide (or not) to
change their behaviour, choices or decisions in response
to the resources and opportunities offered by the
intervention.
Mechanisms are also characterised by Jamal et al. as ex-
ternal treatments. On page 2, the authors write that “Real-
ist evaluators have viewed interventions as ‘working’ by
introducing mechanisms that interact with features of
their context to produce outcomes.” This wrongly implies
that mechanisms can be introduced into a situation and
are thus external; scientific realism holds that mechanisms
are not external factors but latent powers and capabilities,
which are a function of the interaction between interven-
tion resources and responses of participants.
All but one of the “mechanisms” presented by Jamal
and colleagues in Table 2 (p. 8) are activities or imple-
mentation of actions. Only “increased commitment of
disengaged students” would be considered a candidate
mechanism in our understanding of realist research be-
cause it proposes a potential inherent power—“commit-
ment”—that may or may not fire through students
becoming more engaged. This mixing up of the concept
of mechanism with that of intervention (strategy) is a
common error, which overlooks the actual mechanisms
at work [4, 13].
Mediators and moderators or configurations?
Related to the conceptualization of “mechanism” is the
analytical approach to identifying mechanisms and at-
tributing effects to these entities. In several instances,
Jamal et al. propose to use mediation analysis techniques
to identify what mechanisms are at play. For instance,
they write on p. 6: “In this stage, we will test hypotheses
derived in stages 1 and 2 via quantitative analyses of ef-
fect mediation (to examine mechanisms) and moder-
ation (to examine contextual contingencies).” These
authors also write that “Causal mediation analysis helps
to identify process or mediating variables that lie in the
causal pathways between the treatment and the outco-
me….Mediators are post-baseline measures of interim
effects which may or may not account for intervention
effects on end-outcomes” (p. 6).
This explanation demonstrates the authors’ analytical
strategy. To clarify how their approach is in contrast
with, if not opposition to, the scientific realist approach,
we turn to Mahoney [14]. This author presents three
broad ways in which “mechanism” is defined in science
(Table 2). First, when the term “causal mechanism” is
used in experimental designs, it is mostly understood as
a (set of ) intervening variable(s) that explains why a cor-
relation exists between an independent and dependent
variable. Mechanisms are thus situated within the black
box between independent and dependent variables and
express themselves as a variable. “Yet, while the notion
of mechanism as intervening process is useful, this
Table 2 Definitions of mechanism (adapted from Mahoney [14])
Definition #1—“Variables”
(successionist mode)
Definition #2—“Theory of change”
(successionist mode)
Definition #3—Scientific realism
(generative mode)
Definition An intervening (set of) variable(s)
that explain(s) why a correlation
exists between an independent
and dependent variable
Frequently occurring causal patterns
that are triggered under generally
unknown conditions and with
indeterminate consequences. A
mechanism explains by opening up
the black box and showing the cogs
and wheels of the internal machinery.
It provides a continuous and contiguous
chain of causal or intentional links between
the explanans and the explanandum
An unobserved entity that, when
activated, generates an outcome
of interest
Analytical approach Correlational analysis techniques,
such as mediation analysis, are used
to identify “mechanisms” that are
considered to be mediators of the
observed effect
While slightly more broadly defined, this
definition is compatible with probabilistic
approaches to analysis
Causal analysis consists of identifying
the configuration that links the outcome
to mechanism(s) triggered by the
context, often combining quantitative
and qualitative data
Role given to theory Theories in the form of universal
laws can be deduced from empirical
research (covering law principle)
Theories in the form of empirical
knowledge derived from constant
conjunction observations
Research contributes to developing
theories of the middle range
Implications Risk of reduction of mechanisms to
measurable indicators, through
which dynamic processes of change
are reduced to correlations between
variables that stand for more complex
processes
In this view, and similar to definition 1,
causation is reduced to the concatenation
of elements in a causal chain. Causation is
demonstrated to the degree that empirical
regularities can identified
Empirical research allows investigation
of a possible mechanism, thus
identifying a plausible mechanism and
may eventually lead to the identification
of the actual mechanism. Research thus
contributes to increasing the plausibility
of the explanatory
hypothesis
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definition unfortunately does not go beyond correl-
ational assumptions” [14]), and thus, it yields little if any
evidence on causation.
Mahoney identified a second definition of mechanism,
which is “views causal mechanisms as mid-level theories
or variables that can be used to explain a fairly wide
range of outcomes” [14]. Here, causal mechanisms have
been defined as “frequently occurring and easily
recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under
generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate
consequences” [15], cited by Mahoney [14]. This defin-
ition focuses on the underlying theories of change and
does not propose specific analytical strategies to demon-
strate the effect of mechanism. Both the first and second
definition of mechanism share a correlational analysis
approach to causation that focuses on identifying ante-
cedents regularly conjoined with outcomes (successio-
nist mode of causal explanation).
A third definition is used by scientific realism, which
considers a causal mechanism as “an unobserved entity
that, when activated, generates an outcome of interest”
[14] (p. 581). This is the generative causation view on
mechanisms espoused by realist research, which holds
that mechanisms are inherent properties of agents and
structures. “Making and sustaining different choices re-
quires a change in a participant’s reasoning (eg, in their
values, beliefs, attitudes or the logic they apply to a par-
ticular situation) and/or the resources (eg, information,
skills, material resources, support) they have available
to them. This combination of reasoning and resources
is what enables the programme to ‘work’ and is known
as a ‘mechanism’” [11]. This generative conceptualisa-
tion moves the analysis of causation beyond correl-
ational analysis.
Jamal et al. seem to have adopted the first definition
that reduces mechanisms (and also “context”) to mere
variables—although they are perhaps moving towards
the second definition. In any case, their use of the
terms “mediation” and “moderation” implies a variable-
oriented approach to analysis in contrast to the
configuration-oriented perspective that acknowledges
complex causation adopted in scientific realism.
Jamal et al. extend the variable-oriented approach to
the formulation of the hypotheses. The authors present
how they developed a set of so-called pre-hypothesised
intervention mechanisms (which they also label as
mediation hypotheses) separately from a set of pre-
hypothesised contextual barriers and facilitators. We
can only assume the authors followed this pathway be-
cause it would be easier to statistically test the various
hypotheses as separate strands. However, developing
configuration-mechanism-outcome configurations en-
tails more than “segmenting” the programme theory
into a series of variables about context and another on
dealing with what they call “intervention mechanisms”. In
scientific realism, the explanation relies on showing
the relationship between context and mechanism. Hy-
potheses should present a set of programme theories
that explain how the outcome patterns can be ex-
plained by a configuration of intervention, actors,
context and mechanisms. This reflects the acknow-
ledgement of complex causation in realist evaluation.
This does not mean that realist research opposes the
use of quantitative data. Realist research would rather
not conceive of quantitative measures as “variables” (in
the sense of things that vary in amount and cause subse-
quent variation in the next item in the equation) but as
“indicators” (in the sense of a partial measure of an as-
pect of something that “indicates” whether it is present
and/or the extent to which it is present). Using the latter
definition, it is entirely possible to use quantitative mea-
sures for any of context (C), mechanism (M) or outcome
(O), assuming of course that the C, M and O have been
theorized previously, and that the indicators used are “fit
for purpose” for that theory. This is a configurational
usage of indicators as opposed to variable-based analysis.
In summary, in scientific realism, the analysis does not
depend on assessing statistically the correlation between
variables representing intervention, effect, moderators
and mediators. Rather, the analysis uses whatever data
and analytic methods appropriate to build, support, re-
fute or refine plausible explanations that incorporate
intervention, actors, outcomes, context and mechanisms.
This brings us to our third way in which we consider
scientific realism to differ from the methodology pro-
posed by Jamal and colleagues.
Can RCTs account for dynamic CMO configurations?
The final difference in the paper of Jamal et al. relates to
the capacity of the RCT to unpack and make sense of
the dynamic interplay among the intervention, actors,
context and mechanisms that, from a realist perspective,
contributes to the outcome patterns within a complex
intervention. If one considers that CMO configurations
(as proposed by Pawson and Tilley) can be assessed in a
RCT, then this design should be able to demonstrate
how and why outcome patterns are caused by mecha-
nisms “triggered” in specific contexts. Here again, mech-
anisms are to be understood from the realist perspective
and not as a chain of factors between the intervention
and the outcome. The design should also be able to
demonstrate how and why such CMO configurations
vary for different people or in different contexts and
change over time. Given the need for randomisation and
control in an RCT, only relatively few and simple CMO
configurations can be tested at a time. At best, then, the
RCT may help us in assessing the relative contribution
of mechanisms to outcome patterns if the causal
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configuration is uniform but not when it is likely that
different mechanisms will generate different outcomes in
different circumstances, as is the rule rather than the ex-
ception in any health intervention.
Discussion
Jamal et al. write that “This paper provides the first guid-
ance on the theoretical and methodological process of
undertaking a realist RCT” (p. 7). We feel that this claim
is somewhat premature. Not only has the primary study
[16] that is the basis of this paper not been completed
yet, the study was not designed as a realist study in the
first place. More important, Jamal et al.’s definition and
use of key realist concepts does not engage deeply
enough with what we understand to be scientific realism.
In particular, the different understanding of “mechan-
ism” and the reliance on correlation between variables as
the main analytical strategy squeezes realist analysis into
the RCT design like a square peg into a round hole.
The core question concerns how far an approach
based on definition of mechanisms 1 and 2 of Mahoney
[14] can be combined with the realist definition of
mechanism. From our point of view, these are incom-
mensurable views. By its very reliance on randomization,
control and use of variables and its roots in statistical
analysis of correlations, we believe the development of
RCTs to be realist according to Pawson and Tilley’s
views is not fully feasible. We indeed fully agree with
Byrne and Uprichard [17], who argue that cases are
complex if causation works through interactive effects
that in essence are based on interactions between
people. If that is the case, Byrne and Uprichard argue,
causal explanations require analysing interventions from
a systems perspective with a case-based (i.e. configur-
ational) and not a variable-based orientation.
Conclusion
The paper by Jamal et al. is useful because it exposes
the challenges of combining a realist evaluation ap-
proach (as developed by Pawson and Tilley) with the
RCT design. However, the proposed approach does
not allow testing theory in accordance to realist re-
search principles. Not only does the proposed realist
RCT design not deal with the RCT’s inherent inability
to “unpack” complex interventions, it also does not
enable the identification of the dynamic interplay be-
tween intervention, actors, context, mechanisms and
outcomes that a configurational analysis demands. As
a result, the proposed realist RCT design is not, as
we understand it, genuinely realist in nature.
We might be accused of blocking possible innovation,
but the guidance presented by Jamal et al. risks causing
methodological confusion for researchers trying to
understand realist research as espoused by Pawson and
Tilley. This proposal for a realist RCT is indeed symptom-
atic of the mainstreaming of realist research into the wider
health research and policy domains. It raises questions
about the extent to which the RCT methodology can be
modified to accommodate scientific realism. We showed
that Jamal et al. consider mechanisms as observable, exter-
nal treatments, and how their approach reduces complex
causal processes to variables. We argue that their purport-
edly realist RCT design cannot provide a truly realist
understanding, as it lacks compatibility with the analytical
orientation needed to theorize and conduct realist re-
search. As a consequence, it does not allow for plausible
causal claims, nor does it produce warrants for transfer-
able knowledge. This notwithstanding, we believe theory-
informed RCTs would offer a way forward.
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